The TimeSlice Argument AppendixTemporal Externalism about Phenomenal States

This section is dedicated to establishing that the nature of phenomenal states alone can lead to externalist conclusions. In general, it seems that for a physical state at some instance, there seems to be a certain context required for the phenomenal aspect of that state to be realized. In this section we specifically look at temporal externalism. Temporal externalism, as I define it here, is the idea that a current state is individuated in part by states that are in the past or in the future. This section claims that temporal externalism follows naturally from the idea of a phenomenal state supervening some set of minimally sufficient physical conditions.

First, some terminological remarks. Take the phenomenology of a state to mean the conscious aspect of some mental state, that is, the what-it-is-like to be in that state. For instance, if I am in a mental state called pain, there will be certain neurological conditions present, but there will also be a phenomenal aspect that is the feeling of pain. Let us call such a mental state that has a phenomenology for a phenomenal state. By stipulation the phenomenal state has a physical condition that is sufficient for the phenomenal state to be present. Nothing much hinges on the idea of 'physicalism'. We might think of the physical condition as some neurological events, but the details are unimportant here. Let us further call a minimal phenomenological state a state that is physically realized by the minimally sufficient conditions of that state, that is, the minimal required set of physical conditions that suffice for the phenomenal state. By stipulation, a minimal phenomenological state is the simplest possible way for some physical conditions to have a specific conscious aspect.

Next, we think about the temporal nature of the physical conditions. That is, the configuration of these physical conditions in time. Here there are two main options in relating the conscious aspect to the physical conditions. The first option is to assume that a physical instance of say, the state of the brain at some moment in time, some instant, can have a conscious aspect. When I was young, I was rather concerned with this view. I was worried that if I ever got to be cryogenically freezedfrozen, I would experience this as being trapped in some frozen experience that would last until I was unfreezed. Most neurologists, computationalists, and functionalists would probably, at least on reflection, deny this view. Intuitively I think most people favor the idea that phenomenal states are associated not with timeslices of brains, but rather with certain brain processes or other ocurringoccurring over some interval of time. For instance, some neurologists hold that consciousness is not associated with organized temporal events in the brain shorter than say, 200 milliseconds (Gaillard et al., 2009). In any case, let us press on and see if the second option look more promising.

If we reject the timeslice option (the idea that some conditions can be sufficient in nature of their physical state at some instant in time) the consequence is that the minimal phenomenal state is realized from some collection of mental states at different instances, i.e. some set of timeslices T1, T2, T3 … of the brainstate. Let us call the minimal phenomenal state Pm, and the brainstate at timeslice T1, T2 and T3 for M1, M2 and M3. Let us stipulate that M1, M2 and M3 are, taken together, minimally sufficient for Pm. Since Pm is jointly realized by M1, M2 and M3, and only those, we can be certain that any supposed brainstates M0 and M4 are irrelevant to the way it feels to be in state Pm. However, if we cut or destroy either of M1, M2 or M3, the phenomologyphenomenology of Pm will be non-existent (or different).⁴⁷

Now the question is, when does Pm occur? As it stands, the physical timeline runs from M1 to M2 to M3 in succession. It might be natural to think that since M1, M2 and M3, are sufficient only taken together, that Pm can only occur after M3 is complete. This would lead us to think that Pm is dependent on things that happened in the past. After all, once M3 has passed, M2 and M1 are receding ever more distant into the past. In addition to depending on things that happened some time ago, it seems to make Pm an effect of the physical, but not a cause of anything, leading to a position called epiphenomenalism, the view that the conscious feel stands to the physical world like smoke to the fire, or shadows to a moving car. After all, how can Pm have any effect when it is itself an effect of M1, M2 and M3? On the physical level of say, neurons, the conditions M3 isare just the usual firing of neurons. It seems that M3 could have happened without M1 and M2. There is nothing specific at M3 that takes into account M2 and M1. There is nothing particularly mysterious at M3 that could explain the unity with M2 and M1 in causing the phenomenal state. Because of these problems, one might want to try locating Pm at M2 or M1, but one quickly finds that equally absurd conclusions follow.

For instance, if we imagine that Pm occurs already at M1 we escape the idea that Pm is epiphenomenal, and the idea that Pm is conditioned on things that happened in the past, but we must swallow the – perhaps – even greater absurdity that Pm is conditioned by things that will happen in the future. This is because, if Pm happens at M1, it seems that Pm must somehow be in contact with the future M2 and M3. For if M2 and M2M2 and M3 are not going to actually happen, then Pm could not happen at M1 in the first place.⁴⁸

And of course, if M2 is where Pm happens, we face both of the problems above, except perhaps that the distance to the past and the future is less.

Thus, we are surrounded by absurdities on all sides. If my reasoning is correct, and my stipulations fair to the matter at hand, then we must accept that something fishy is actually going on. That is, there is something about phenomenal experience that resists capture in our ordinary causalThe earliest surviving version — emailed to the thesis advisor at 01:29 on 21 August 2012 — closes on “our ordinary causal physicalist framework.” The word is absent from every later copy. physicalist framework. Alternatively, one can accept the timeslice view, where an experience can be “frozen.” This view seems to me equally, if not more, absurd, especially when we consider consciously experiencing such things as music, which rely on the immediate past and future essentially for its particular character.⁴⁹

1. 47We assume that gradualism of phenomenal states is not always possible, as is plausible on any semantic, functional, computational, or representational theory. As it stands, it does not imply that the feeling is necessarily non-existent, it could merely be different: We can, however, stipulate that Pm is the phenomenological state that is simplest to realize in M. ↩
2. 48There is a position here that might lead one to suppose that M2 and M3 are always determined by the M1 state, such that it is not accidental whether M2 and M3 occurs. This would lead to a strong determinism about what would happen. For regardless of the system, the actual occurrence of M2 and M3 seems to be a rather contingent affair; for instance, a meteor could hit someone in the head just after M1.) ↩
3. 49The timeslice view is persuasively argued against in (Fisher, 2007). — Fisher, J. C. (2007). Why nothing mental is just in the head. Noûs, 41(2), 318–334. ↩